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∗

I. INTRODUCTION: UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ALABAMA’S H.B. 56
In May 2010, First Lady Michelle Obama was visiting a suburban
Washington, D.C. elementary school when a second grader said to her,
“[m]y mom . . . says that Barack Obama is taking everybody away that
1
doesn’t have papers.” Mrs. Obama responded, “that’s something that
we have to work on, right? . . . To make sure that people can be here
2
with the right kind of papers, right? That’s exactly right.” The young
3
girl then disclosed, “[b]ut my mom doesn’t have any papers.” If this
second grade girl had been in Alabama, after the enactment of Alabama’s House Bill 56 (“H.B. 56”), the school officials would have been
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Stephanie Condon, Second Grader to Michelle Obama: “My Mom Doesn’t have any
Papers,” CBS NEWS (May 19, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20005436503544.html (also recounted in Amici Curiae Brief for the National Education Association, the
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2
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3
Id.
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obligated to report the child’s mother’s violation of H.B. 56 or risk jail
time.
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court decided
4
Plyler v. Doe in 1982, a case which guarantees undocumented stu5
dents access to a free public K-12 education, Latino undocumented
students continue to experience daunting challenges to attend school.
An example of such an obstacle is the recent enactment of Alabama’s
6
H.B. 56. Enacted in June of 2011 as an immigration restriction meas7
ure, H.B. 56 has several provisions that directly and adversely impact
8
the ability of undocumented children to attend school.
This essay analyzes the provisions of H.B. 56 that affect the education of undocumented children and examines the constitutionality
of the provisions in view of current federal law, as embodied in the
Plyler case. As immigration law is an area of federal legislative authority, a key constitutional concern is whether the Alabama law is
preempted. Following the analysis of whether this law is preempted,
this essay further discusses the recent litigation filed following the
passage of this act. We also examine other recently-enacted state antiimmigrant measures that pose obstacles to undocumented students
and conclude by offering thoughts regarding the use of children as
pawns in the raging immigration debate in the United States.
II. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT FEDERAL LAW AND H.B. 56
A. Plyler v. Doe
The landmark case Plyler v. Doe established the legal norm that
9
states may not restrict public education based on immigration status.
In Plyler, a Texas statute withheld funding for the education of undocumented students and permitted school districts to ban undocumented students from enrolling if they did not pay for their school10
ing. At issue was whether the Texas statute violated the Equal Pro11
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held in the
4
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). For a recent in-depth and excellent scholarly analysis
of this case, see MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V.
DOE AND THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOL CHILDREN (2012).
5
See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
6
2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 2).
7
United States v. Alabama, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1292 (N.D. Ala. 2011); 2011 ALA. LAWS
535 (H.B. 56 § 2).
8
Beason-Hammon Ala. Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B.
56 § 2).
9
Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
10 Id. at 202.
11 Id.
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affirmative, using an elevated form of rational basis review. The
Court stated that “[i]t is difficult to understand precisely what the
State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of
a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to prob14
lems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.”
In Plyler, for the first time, the Supreme Court clearly stated that
undocumented persons are protected under the Equal Protection
15
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the undocumented
plaintiff children used the Equal Protection Clause to challenge the
16
state of Texas’s denial of free public K-12 education. The Court performed an Equal Protection analysis, starting with the recognition that
education is “perhaps the most important function of state and local
17
governments.” The Court found that the state’s denial of an education to undocumented students could hardly be considered rational
18
unless it furthered some substantial state goal. In assessing the rationality of the Texas statute, the Court warned that the cost to the
nation and to the innocent children involved must be taken into ac19
count. The Court also found that “it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu20
nity of an education,” and that because the state took it upon itself to
provide an education to children, it had to be made “available to all
21
on equal terms.”
Expressing concern that it would be unfair to penalize undocumented students for their parents’ unlawful presence in the United
22
States, the Court found that undocumented children “can affect nei23
ther their parents’ conduct nor their own status.” The Court concluded that there could be no rational justification for penalizing the
children for their presence in the country because the Texas law was

12

Id. at 222.
Id. at 224.
14 Id. at 230.
15 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 213; see also Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 443 (2004) (discussing how “[p]rior to
Plyler, the Supreme Court had never taken up the question of whether undocumented aliens
could seek Fourteenth Amendment equal protections”).
16 See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
17 Id. at 222 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
18 Id. at 224.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 223 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 220.
23 Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
13
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directed towards children and imposed its discriminatory burden on
24
the basis of a characteristic over which the children had no control.
B.

Examination of H.B. 56 and its Provisions that Implicate Plyler

H.B. 56 has several sections that pose a threat to an undocumented student’s Plyler-based access to a K-12 education: specifically,
25
Sections 5, 8, 13, and 28. Section 28 is particularly concerning since it
contains extensive information-gathering requirements that may hin26
der school enrollment for undocumented children. Section 28(a)(1)
mandates that school officials inquire as to whether the enrolled child
27
“was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States.” Section
28
28(a)(2) asks parents to provide a valid birth certificate for the child.
If the parent cannot produce one, he or she may produce a document
establishing citizenship or immigration status, or a sworn declaration
that the child is a “citizen or an alien lawfully present in the United
29
States.” If neither of these can be presented, the child is deemed to
30
be “an alien unlawfully present in the United States.”
Administrators use the information from these questions to pre31
pare an annual document to the Alabama Department of Education.
This document reports the number of undocumented students en32
rolled in the district. The Alabama Department of Education then
uses the data to prepare an annual report to the state legislature on
the costs associated with the school attendance of these undocu33
mented students. The law expressly permits state and local officials
34
to share this information with the federal government. Section 28 is
of particular concern because of the chilling effect that it may have on
the enrollment of undocumented children whose parents may fear
35
deportation.

24

See id.
2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 §§ 5, 8, 13, 28).
26 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28).
27 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28 (a)(1)).
28 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28 (a)(2)).
29 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28(a)(2)).
30 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28(a)(3)).
31 Id. (H.B. 56 § 28(d)(1)-(5)).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See MARIA PABON LOPEZ & GERARDO R. LOPEZ, PERSISTENT INEQUALITY:
CONTEMPORARY REALITIES IN THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED LATINA/O STUDENTS 40
(2010) (discussing the chilling effect as an area of concern for schools in enrolling undocumented
students).
25
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Other provisions, such as Sections 5, 8, and 13 of H.B. 56, also
36
pose challenges regarding the education of undocumented students.
For example, Section 5(f) requires employees of the state (including
37
those at schools) to “report any violations of the Act.” Hence, any
inadvertent disclosure of an illegal immigrant being employed in vio38
lation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Act would have to be reported.
This could be done innocently, for example, by a young child, who may
speak of his or her undocumented parents being at work, much in the
same manner as the young girl in the Michelle Obama story discussed
39
above.
40
Section 13 of the Alabama law raises additional concerns. For
instance, Section 13(a)(1) makes it a crime to “[c]onceal, harbor, or
shield . . . an alien from detection in any place in [Alabama], including
any building or means of transportation, if the person knows . . . the
alien has come to, has entered, or remains in the United States in vio41
lation of federal law.” Section 13(a)(2) makes it a criminal offense to
encourage someone known to be an undocumented alien to “reside in
42
[Alabama].” Furthermore, Section 13(a)(3) prohibits the knowing
“transportation of undocumented alien in furtherance of the unlawful
43
present of the alien in the United States.” The provisions in Section
13 interfere with the Plyler mandate in at least two ways. First, these
provisions may criminalize the actions of teachers, school administrators, and bus drivers who interact daily with undocumented students
and their parents. Even if these provisions are not construed to criminalize the actions of teachers, school administrators, and bus drivers
who interact daily with undocumented students and their parents,
44
their existence may still cause the chilling effect discussed above.
Finally, Section 8 of H.B. 56 bans undocumented aliens from at45
tending public colleges in Alabama. Other states such as Virginia
46
and North Carolina have preceded Alabama in such a ban. Although
the only federal district court opinion on point suggests that this sec-

36

2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 §§ 5, 8, 13).
Id. (H.B. 56 § 5(f)).
38 Id. (H.B. 56 §§ 11, 15).
39 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
40 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 13).
41 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(1)).
42 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(2)).
43 Id. (H.B. 56 § 13 (a)(3)).
44 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
45 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 8).
46 See Danielle Holley-Walker, Searching for Equality: Equal Protection Clause Challenges
to Bans on the Admission of Undocumented Students to Public Universities, 2011 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 357, 361.
37
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47

tion would pass constitutional muster, the section does not comport
with Plyler’s promise of educational equality for undocumented stu48
dents. While Plyler is distinguishable from Section 8 because it pertains to a K-12 education, rather than Section 8’s focus on higher education, in cases following Plyler, the Supreme Court has “emphasized
49
the importance of states providing college and graduate education.”
C.

H.B. 56 Section 28 Likely Violates Plyler v. Doe
50

Section 28, which requires the data collection as discussed above,
51
contravenes Plyler. Alabama’s undocumented students have to contend with an indirect barrier to school enrollment in the form of an
52
information collection or registration scheme. This scheme acts to
chill the guaranteed free public education Plyler offers.
What makes Plyler unique are the strong public policy considera53
tions in favor of the education of the undocumented children. As a
result of Plyler, it has been a common practice to advise school dis54
tricts against rules that would create a “chilling effect,” particularly,
rules that would leave undocumented parents afraid of sending their
children to school for fear of being reported to the authorities. Ten
states have specific guidance that instructs schools not to collect in55
formation on immigration status. Pennsylvania has a state statute
that prevents school districts from inquiring about students’ immigra56
tion status. Prior to the enactment of H.B. 56, the Alabama Education Department advised its school districts not to inquire into the
57
citizenship status of children enrolling in public schools. Further, the
47 Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004). Notably, the court
decision did not address the Equal Protection clause. See Holley-Walker, supra note 46, at 361.
48 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
49 See Holley-Walker, supra note 46, at 363.
50 See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
51 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 28).
52 Id.
53 See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
54 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
55 Brief for the National Education Association, the Alabama Education Association, and
the National School Boards Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and
Urging Reversal of the District Court’s Denial of a Preliminary Injunction, at 12-14, Hispanic
Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 11-14535-CC (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2011) (providing list and
cites of states).
56 Id. at 14; see also 22 PA. CODE § 11.11(d) (2011).
57 Alabama Department of Education, Legal Cases Related to English Language Learners,
ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS, http://alex.state.al.us/ell/node/58 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012)
(discussing that the Plyler “court ruled that public schools may not . . . [e]ngage in any practice to
‘chill’ the right of access to school[, r]require students or parents to disclose or document their
immigration status[, or m]ake inquiries of students or parents that may expose their undocumented status”).
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Federal Department of Education has circulated a “Dear Colleague”
letter, advising states and localities on the consequences of possibly
violating Plyler by “[taking] action to discourage the participation of
students that could be viewed or would likely result in denying access”
58
to public schools.
In addition to guidance from the states and the federal government, LULAC v. Wilson, the only case addressing the issue since Ply59
er, is also persuasive. In LULAC, a California district court invalidated a state statute that required schools to ask about applicants’
immigration status and required denial of admission to students found
60
to be undocumented.
Plyler, however, is not only contravened by statutes, such as the
one in LULAC that bar academic admissions for undocumented stu61
dents. For instance, while H.B. 56 only requires Alabama schools to
gather information for a statewide report, and it does not require
schools to deny admission, the statute is still problematic from the
62
perspective of undocumented students’ access to education. Sure,
the argument can be made that H.B. 56’s information-gathering requirements are benign and can assist the state. For example, at least
one scholar has stated the state of Texas in Plyler “failed to offer any
credible supporting evidence that the proportionally small diminution
of funds on each child . . . will have a grave impact on the quality of
63
education.” The Plyler Court also stated “the record in no way supports . . . that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve
64
the overall quality of education in the state.” Scholars who support
H.B. 56 assert that Alabama, unlike the State of Texas in Plyler, is only
seeking to gather immigration status information so that it could offer
the “credible supporting evidence” which the Plyler Court found lack65
ing. Then,
[i]f the data shows that providing free education to those who are
unlawfully present . . . has no significant impact on education or
its costs . . . the Alabama law will . . . not alter the status quo that
58 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, Hispanic
Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 11-2484, 2011 WL 2654277 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2011), available
at http://www.2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201101.pdf.
59 LULAC v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 See 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56).
63 John Eastman, Editorial, Permissible and Sensible, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/04/should-alabama-schools-help-catch-illegalimmigrants/alabamas-immigration-law-is-permissible-and-sensible.
64 Id.
65 Id.

238

FIU Law Review

[6:231

has existed since Plyler. But if the data shows that providing a
free public education to illegal immigrants severely undermines
the quality, and/or drastically increases the cost, of education for
those who are lawful residents and citizens, the state will have
66
met an important caveat in the Plyler decision itself.
Scholars who support the Alabama statute and use this “credible
67
supporting evidence” rationale, misquote and misinterpret Plyler.
The correct quote from Plyler reads: “[t]here is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on
68
the State’s economy.” To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing
69
their labor to the economy and tax money to the state fisc.” Further,
the Plyler Court was concerned about creating a “permanent subclass
of illiterates” that would lead to an increase in “unemployment, wel70
fare, and crime.” Hence, even if Alabama was able to evidence a
large cost associated with educating undocumented students, such evidence would not be enough to justify the statute. The Plyler Court
would not have been persuaded by that information alone. Alabama
would have to show that the costs of denying an education are greater
than the future costs associated with more unemployment, welfare,
crime, loss of “the tax money [undocumented aliens provide] to states”
71
and “contributions to the economy.” There will never be a time when
the benefits of education to society will be less than those of denying
an education. In the Supreme Court’s words, our public school system
has “supreme importance” as the “primary vehicle for transmitting
72
‘the values on which our society rests.’”
By analogy, imagine that the administrators of New York City decided that it was not going to provide police service to the South
Bronx. The City would state that it does not have enough funding to
provide these services, and it is not in the interest of officer safety
since this area is too dangerous. Under the logic of Section 28, if the

66

Id.
Id.
68 Id. at 227.
69 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982).
70 Id. at 230.
71 Peter Shapiro, Editorial, Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/04/should-alabama-schools-help-catch-illegalimmigrants/be-careful-what-you-wish-for-alabama (The “contributions to the economy” in the
form of low wage work may be a particularly large cost. Professor Spiro writes that, “[a]cross the
state line in Georgia, farmers are bleeding money as they find themselves with no one to bring in
the harvest.”).
72 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Ambach v.
Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)).
67
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City could gather information showing the benefits of not providing
this service were great enough, the City would be justified in not doing
so. Like education, however, it is hard to see how the cost savings in
not providing police would be preferable to the costs associated with
anarchy and loss of property and life that would most likely result.
Providing basic law enforcement is preferred to non-enforcement, just
like education is preferred to no education.
Furthermore, current understanding of the benefits associated
with education is even greater today than when the Court decided
Plyler. There is ample evidence showing the economic returns of an
education; for example, the Census Bureau has found that college
graduates earn almost double the amount that high school graduates
73
earn. Another study has shown that an additional high school graduate yields a public benefit of $209,000 in more tax revenue and less
74
government expenditure.
Even as a research study, Section 28 is not a good practice. If the
statute was enacted for the purpose of studying the costs associated
with undocumented immigration, it will not succeed in achieving its
goal. It is known that persons will alter their behavior when they
75
know they are being studied. Here, undocumented immigrants know
their status is being scrutinized when the school officials ask for that
information. Thus, undocumented students and their parents will alter
their behavior accordingly. The information gathered by Section 28
will likely decrease enrollment either because undocumented families
will know the state is keeping tabs on them and their children, or because they are afraid their immigration status will be revealed to federal authorities. Thus, any enrollment numbers will likely be smaller
than the real numbers. Consequently, the costs would be undercounted. Early reports show that there is a decrease, not just in undocumented student enrollment, but Latino student enrollment over76
all in Alabama. This may be because there are mixed status families
73 Jennifer Cheeseman Day & Eric C. Newburger, The Big Payoff: Educational Attainment
and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 2002),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf.
74 Clive Belfield, Henry Levin, Peter Muennig & Cecilia Rouse, The Costs and Benefits of
an Excellent Education for All of America’s Children, CENTER FOR COST-BENEFIT STUD. OF
EDUC.
TCHRS.
C.,
COLUM.
UNIV.
(Jan.
2007),
http://www.cbcse.org/media/download_gallery/Leeds_Report_Final_Jan2007.pdf.
75 An example of this phenomenon is the Hawthorne Effect, in which research subjects
alter their behavior when they know they are being observed. See Michel Anteby & Rakesh
Khurana, A New Vision, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/hawthorne/09.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2012).
76 Alan Gomez, Alabama Immigration Law Marked by Hispanic School Absences, USA
TODAY (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-10-02/Alabamaimmigration-Hispanic-school-absences/50638454/1; see also Alabama: Many Immigrants Pull
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with both documented and undocumented members. Since persons
can be prosecuted for encouraging undocumented immigrants to re77
main in Alabama, it is plausible that even a U.S. citizen or a lawfullypresent immigrant relative is afraid to enroll an undocumented child
in school. It is even more likely that such persons do not know all of
H.B. 56’s provisions and are just afraid of it in general.
Certainly such a fear would be warranted since the legislature
showed an animus toward undocumented people when it enacted the
78
bill. Alabama House Majority Leader, Micky Hammon, chief sponsor of H.B. 56, stated, “[w]hen this bill passes and is signed into law, I
think you will see illegals leaving north Alabama and going elsewhere
79
. . . . This bill is designed to make these people export themselves.”
He further exclaimed, “[w]e really want to prevent illegal immigrants
from coming to Alabama and prevent those who are here from put80
ting down roots.”
A better way to study the costs associated with undocumented
students would be to take a small sample of certain representative
schools throughout the state. Courts may prefer such a sampling approach since it is narrowly tailored and would have a less significant
impact on undocumented people. Such an approach would also be
cheaper for the state and school districts to implement since it would
require less time and human resources.
D. H.B. 56 Section 28 May Cause FERPA Violations
The application of Section 28 may violate the Family Education
81
and Privacy Rights Act (FERPA). This federal law prohibits the disclosure of certain identifying information about a student unless his or
82
her parent gives written consent. Although the federal law contains
certain exceptions, none of them apply with respect to Section 28 of

Children
from
Schools,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
30,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/us/alabama-many-immigrants-pull-children-fromschools.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Alabama%20may%20children%20pull%20children%20from%2
0school&st=cse.
77 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
78 M.J. Ellington, House OKs Immigration Bill, THE TIMES DAILY (Apr. 5, 2011),
http:///www.timesdaily.com/article/20110406/NEWS.110409882?Title=House-OKs-immigrationbill.
79 Id.
80 R. Cort Kirkwood, Alabama Gov. Signs Immigration Bill; Leftists Outraged, THE NEW
AM. (June 10, 2011), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/immigration/7817-alabama-govsigns-immigration-bill-leftists-outraged.
81 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2006).
82 Id.
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83

the Alabama law. A potential FERPA violation could occur if a
school district turns over specific information on the undocumented
student to the Alabama Department of Education for purposes of
submitting the report to the legislature. A FERPA violation would
also likely occur if the school decides it has to comply with Sections 5
and 6 of H.B. 56, which prohibit any “policy or practice” that “limits
communication” with federal enforcement, and shares information
84
about undocumented students or parents with federal authorities.
III. LITIGATION OVER H.B. 56
Once Governor Bentley signed H.B. 56 into law, the U.S. Department of Justice, a civil rights group, and a group of clergy filed
suits in federal court with the result that only some sections of the law
85
were preliminarily enjoined.
A. Section 8 of H.B. 56 Enjoined on Preemption Grounds
In Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama enjoined
Section 8 of H.B. 56, which prohibited aliens “not lawfully present” in
86
the United States from enrolling in public post-secondary education.
The second sentence of Section 8 defined aliens “not lawfully present
in the United States” as those that do not “possess lawful permanent
residence or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. §
87
1101.” However, the Alabama legislature did not include refugees
and asylum seekers, who, under U.S. immigration law, are lawfully present under other provisions of federal law, just not under 8 U.S.C. §
88
89
1101. Because only Congress may classify aliens, and since Alabama’s classification of an alien contradicted federal law, Section 8
90
was preempted.
In Bentley, the plaintiff, Esayas Haile, sought a preliminary injunction claiming that he was a refugee and had standing to challenge
83 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (2012). For further information, see Questions and Answers for School
Districts
and
Parents:
Documentation,
U.S.
DEP’T
EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201101.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
84 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 §§ 5(a)-6(a)).
85 Campbell Robertson, Alabama Wins in Ruling on its Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
30,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/us/alabama-immigration-lawupheld.html?ref=us.
86 Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 11-2484, 2011 WL 5516953, at *24 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 28, 2011).
87 Id. at *20.
88 Id.
89 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
90 Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala., 2011 WL 5516953, at *23.

242

[6:231

FIU Law Review
91

Section 8 because of his denial of an education. Interestingly, the
federal government did not challenge Section 8 in its suit based on
preemption. The Court suggested that if the Alabama legislature redrafts Section 8 so there is no contradiction with federal law, and it
passes this new version, such a new Section 8 could stand under a preemption analysis since it seems this was a drafting error and not a
92
purposeful attempt to exclude asylum seekers or refugees.
B.

H.B. 56’s Section 13 Enjoined on Preemption Grounds
93

As previously discussed, Section 13(a)(1) makes it unlawful for a
person to “conceal, harbor, or shield . . . or conspire to conceal, harbor,
94
or shield [an alien]. . . from detection in any place in this state . . . ”,
and Section 13(a)(2) makes “induc[ing]” an alien to come to or reside
95
in the state unlawful. Section 13(a)(3) criminalizes the “transport, or
attempt to transport, or conspire to transport an alien” whose pres96
ence in the United States is in violation of federal law. Section
13(a)(4) prohibits entering into rental agreements with unlawful
97
aliens.
The District Court granted a preliminary injunction invalidating
98
Section 13 on preemption grounds. It noted that “Congress has provided a uniform, comprehensive scheme of sanctions for those who
99
unlawfully enter the United States.” The district court used a “conflict preemption” analysis to invalidate the section. The federal government asserted that the state law “conflict[ed] with the operation of
100
federal immigration law.” Alabama claimed that it was “concurrent
101
enforcement” with federal law. However, the court disagreed and
concluded that Section 13 “actually prohibit[ed] conduct allowed under federal law and criminaliz[ed] conduct that is lawful under federal
102
law.” For example, federal law provides an exemption for clergy un103
der its transportation and harboring scheme. Section 13 had no such
exemption; instead, Section 13 only had exemptions for first respond-

91
92
93
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95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at *20.
See id. at *21-22.
See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(1)).
Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(2)).
Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(3)).
Id. (H.B. 56 § 13(a)(4)).
United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
Id. at 1330. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1330.
Id. at 1331.
Id.
Id.
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104

ers and protective service providers. Section 13(a)(2) was also unconstitutional because federal law did not make it a crime to “induce
an illegal alien to enter Alabama from another state,” only the induc105
ing of an alien to enter the United States. The court also found conflicts between federal law and state law because Section 13(a)(3) and
(4) had elements not present in the federal statute, such as punishing
106
“transportation conspiracy” and “rental agreements.” There is also a
concern that Alabama courts would interpret “harboring” differently
107
than federal courts and impose their own law. The court distinguished recent cases from other states in which federal courts did not
find preemption when prosecuting employers for hiring undocu108
mented aliens. According to the court, those cases concerned areas
of license and regulation of employment where Congress has specifi109
cally preserved authority for the states.
C.

Section 13 Could Also Have Been Found Unconstitutional Using
a Plyler Analysis

Section 13 would punish the “transportation” and “harboring” of
110
aliens present in Alabama in violation of immigration law. It would
111
also make it illegal to “encourage” such aliens to remain in Alabama.
In the H.B. 56 litigation, civil rights plaintiffs raised the possibility that
a violation of Plyler could result if schools could not transport un112
documented children on buses. Also, if school officials protected an
undocumented child in an emergency or when the parent was not
available, a conflict with the anti-harboring provision would exist if
that could be considered “harboring.”
D. Inconsistency Between the Eleventh Circuit and the Alabama
District Court
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama did not
113
enjoin Section 28. The court failed to do so even though the federal
104

Id. at 1329.
See id. at 1334.
106 Id. at 1329, 1324.
107 Id. at 1335.
108 Id. at 1331 (distinguishing Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1979
(2011); Arizona Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano, Nos. CV07 1355 PHX NVW, CV07 1684
PHX NVW, 2007 WL 4570303, at *13-14 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2007)).
109 Id.
110 See 2011 ALA. LAWS 535 (H.B. 56 § 13).
111 Id.
112 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 232, Hispanic Interest Coal. of
Ala. v. Bentley, No. 11-2484, 2011 WL 2654277 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2011).
113 Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
105
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government lawsuit asserted that Section 28 created a “mandatory
data collection, classification, and reporting requirement”, and was an
“impermissibl[e] …registration scheme for children (and derivatively
their parents)” akin to the one the Supreme Court invalidated in
114
Hines v. Davidowitz. In Hines, the Supreme Court held that a state
“cannot inconsistently with the purposes of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional
115
or auxiliary regulations.” The Pennsylvania statute required that all
aliens over eighteen register annually and carry an alien registration
116
card. The state law was unconstitutional because its independent,
state-specific registration scheme conflicted with a federal Alien Registration Act, and was an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execu117
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
In failing to enjoin Section 28 of H.B.56, the district court distinguished Section 28 from the Pennsylvania statute because it did not
“attempt to register anyone, or create registration requirements in
118
addition to those established by Congress in the INA.” The court
did not elaborate on how exactly H.B. 56 was different. Yet two weeks
later, in an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap119
peals enjoined Section 28. The appeals court did not elaborate on its
rationale.
Even though the Eleventh Circuit enjoined Alabama’s enforcement of Section 28 on interlocutory appeal by the federal govern120
ment, it remains a threat to the education of undocumented children.
Its “chilling effect” has already resulted in many Latino children’s absences.

114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 1348 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 67.
Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
United States v. Alabama, Nos. 11-14532, 11-14535, 2011 WL 4863957 (11th Cir. Oct. 14,

2011).
120 Id. The Eleventh Circuit did not elaborate on the merits of the federal government’s
claim concerning Section 28 except to state that the stringent requirements for granting the
injunction pending appeal had been met. Id. Interestingly, however, in addressing the first factor
for granting the injunction, the Circuit Court stated that “[a] substantial likelihood of success on
the merits requires a showing of only likely or probable, rather than certain, success.” Id. (quoting Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, the
court noted that restraint must be shown in enjoining legislative enactments before there is a full
trial on the merits unless demanded by the Constitution. Id. Although Alabama is enjoined
from enforcing Section 28 now, it is unclear what the future of the Act will be after a trial on the
merits.
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IV. RECENT ANTI-IMMIGRANT LEGISLATION IN OTHER STATES AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS
While Alabama’s H.B. 56 is certainly the most comprehensive
and far-reaching measure, states such as Georgia, South Carolina,
Utah, and Indiana have enacted statutes that impact the education of
undocumented children. In each of these states, the U.S. Department
of Justice, along with various civil rights, religious, community, and
business groups have already raised challenges to the laws on the basis
of federal preemption, as well as constitutional protections under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A. Utah
Utah H.B. 497, signed into law in March of 2011, includes the requirement for the determination of immigration status by state and
121
local law enforcement. The Act also amends Section 76-9-2901, concerning the transporting or harboring of illegal aliens, to make it
unlawful to “encourage or induce an alien to come to, enter, or reside
122
in [the] state . . . .” Utah’s law does not require the same strict immigration status information gathering as Alabama’s H.B. 56, nor does it
include a broad provision concerning the transportation or harboring
of undocumented aliens. Importantly, unlike Alabama’s H.B. 56,
Utah’s amendment to the harboring laws would likely not criminalize
a parent’s transportation of an undocumented child within the state
since Section 76-10-2901(2)(a) requires that the transportation be
123
done “for commercial advantage or private financial gain.”
On May 3, 2011, the National Immigration Law Center, ACLU,
and ACLU of Utah filed a class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that federal law preempts and that H.B. 497
violates the constitutional protections of inter alia, the Equal Protec124
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court granted a
Temporary Restraining Order in favor of Plaintiffs and stayed the
125
execution of H.B. 497 until hearing of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prelimi126
nary Injunction on February 17, 2012.
121 See Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, ch. 21, 2011 UTAH LAWS 21 (codified as
amended at 2011 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-1001 to -1009).
122 Id. § 76-10-2901(2)(c).
123 Id.
124 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 10, Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 11-401 (D. Utah May 3, 2011).
125 Order, Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 11-401, Doc. No. 45 (D. Utah May 11,
2011).
126 Order to Consolidate Cases and to Set Briefing Schedule, Utah Coal. of La Raza v.
Herbert, No. 11-401, Doc. No. 129 (D. Utah Nov. 28, 2011).
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Georgia
127

Georgia’s H.B 87 includes provisions that make it a state crime
128
to harbor or transport undocumented persons within the state. The
Act states that “[a] person who, while committing another criminal
offense, knowingly and intentionally transports or moves an illegal
alien in a motor vehicle . . . shall be guilty of the offense of transport129
ing . . . an illegal alien.” This places undocumented parents in a very
dubious position. Since traffic violations are considered “criminal
offenses” under the statute, it is foreseeable that criminal penalties
could be applied to parents who are transporting undocumented children to school. Certainly, the thought of such extreme consequences
as a result of taking undocumented children to school will be a factor
in deciding whether to send them at all.
On June 8, 2011, Plaintiffs’ nonprofit organizations, business associations, and certain individuals filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin portions of H.B. 87 that were to be effective on July 1,
130
2011. Plaintiffs’ nonprofit organizations challenged the Act on the
131
grounds of preemption, and on other constitutional grounds. Accordingly, the District Court enjoined the enforcement of Sections 7
and 8 of H.B. 87 on the basis of federal preemption and held that the
Act did not violate the other liberties and rights asserted by Plain132
tiffs. The state has appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit
133
Court of Appeals.
C.

Indiana

In May of 2011, the Indiana House and Senate passed S.B. 590
and H.B. 1402. S.B. 590 requires state and local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws and verify the immigration
134
status of individuals that they lawfully stop, detain, or arrest. Addi-

127

Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, 2011 GA. LAWS 252 (H.B.

87).
128 Id. (H.B. 87 § 7, Art. 5 (codified as amended at 2011 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-200(b)
and 201(b)).
129 Id. § 16-11-200(b) (2011).
130 Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1322-23 (N.D. Ga.
2011).
131 Id. at 1323, 1328.
132 Id. at 1340.
133 Brief for Judicial Watch, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, Ga.
Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (No. 11-13044).
134 Act of May 10, 2011, 2011 IND. SEA 590, § 3 (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 5-219-5(a) (2011)). Individual alien plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of S.E.A.
590 and sought to enjoin Sections 18 (creating violation under Indiana law for any person to
knowingly offer or accept a consular identification card as valid form of id) and 19 (authorizing
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tionally, H.B. 1402, and S.B. 590 Sections 12, 13, and 14 exclude undocumented students from receiving in-state tuition rates at public
universities and excludes them from receiving financial or scholarship
135
aid.
Although the primary education of undocumented students is not
being facially restricted or inhibited, the state of Indiana is clearly limiting the educational advancement of these individuals. The consequences of this are the same as those that concerned Justice Brennan
in Plyler: the “depriv[ation] . . . of any disfavored group of an education . . . foreclose[s] the means by which that group might rise to the
136
level of esteem in which it is held by the majority.” Importantly, it
must be recognized that Plyler was decided nearly three decades ago,
a time when much more could be accomplished professionally with a
high school diploma. In today’s technology-dependent world, access
to higher education is more important than ever before. Indiana’s
denial of access to undocumented students only serves as a mechanism to further disenfranchise an educationally disadvantaged group.
D. South Carolina
137

Similar to Georgia’s H.B. 87, South Carolina’s S.B. 20 provides
strict penalties for knowingly transporting or harboring a person un138
Thus, parents, friends,
lawfully in the country, making it a felony.
and other persons run the risk of a felony arrest by driving an un139
documented student to school or having him or her in their home.
Although the law does not require that schools review and compile
statistics on the immigration status of their students, the increased
risks that arise as a result of the new measure will likely have a negative effect on the undocumented student population. It will become
increasingly difficult for undocumented aliens to remain in South

law enforcement to make warrantless arrests based on immigration status) of the Act. Id. The
District Court granted plaintiffs preliminary injunction as to Sections 18 and 19 on the grounds
of preemption, the Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process. Buquer v. City of
Indianapolis, 799 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
135 Act of July 1, 2011, ch. 11, 2011 Ind. S.B. 590 §§ 12-14 (codified as amended at IND. CODE
§§ 21-11-7.5-1, -14-11-1, and -15-2-5 respectively (2011)).
136 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
137 See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
138 Act of June 27, 2011, 2011 S.C. S.B. 20 § 4, (codified as amended at S.C. CODE § 16-9-460
(2011)) (under Georgia’s H.B. 87, a similar offense is only a misdemeanor).
139 Parents of Students Worry over South Carolina Immigration Law, FOX NEWS (Nov. 16,
2011),
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/11/15/s-carolina-immigration-law-worrieslatino-students/.
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Carolina with this new mandate from the Legislature emphasizing
140
immigration enforcement.
As with the other state legislation discussed above, S.B. 20 has also been challenged by a number of individuals, civil rights and non141
142
profit groups, as well as the U.S. Department of Justice. On December 22, 2011, the District Court for the District of South Carolina
issued an order granting private plaintiffs’ and the Federal Government’s motions for preliminary injunction as to Sections 4, 5, and 6 of
143
144
the Act. The injunction was granted on the basis of preemption.
Accordingly, those sections of S.B. 20, that make transporting and harboring undocumented aliens state felonies are enjoined pending a full
trial on the merits.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Plyer provides that state laws that interfere with the guarantee of
145
a free public education are ineffective tools for immigration reform.
The use of undocumented schoolchildren as pawns in the raging immigration debate is inappropriate and inconsistent with Plyler. The
protection Plyler affords has endured thirty years, in large part because it is a high water mark in United States jurisprudence that recognizes this country’s status as a nation of immigrants. The Supreme
Court in Plyler recognized the innocence of undocumented children
and that they should not be penalized for the acts of their parents,
146
which cannot be changed by an innocent child seeking an education.
Creating a climate of fear that would induce the parents of more than
147
a thousand Latino students in Alabama to be absent from school is
not in the best interest of the children, the state, or the nation. Even

140 Act of June 27, 2011, 2011 S.C. S.B. 20 § 17 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE § 23-6-60
(2011)), creates the Illegal Immigration Enforcement Unit within the Department of Public
Safety. The task of the Unit is to enforce federal and state immigration laws throughout the
state. Id. The Unit will be separate and distinct from all other state law enforcement agencies
and will have jurisdiction in all counties. Id. at §§ 23-6-60(C)(2)(c)-(d).
141 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Lowcountry Immigration Coal. v.
Haley, No. 11-2779, 2011 WL 4824401 (D.S.C. Oct. 12, 2011).
142 Josh Gerstein, South Carolina Immigration Law Sparks Suit From Justice Department,
POLITICO
(Oct.
31,
2011),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67274.html#ixzz1cOV6vFh8.
143 United States v. South Carolina, No. 11-2958, 2011 WL 6973241 (D. S.C. Dec. 22, 2011).
144 Id.
145 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
146 Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
147 Verna Gates, Appeals Court Blocks Parts of Alabama Immigration Law, REUTERS (Oct.
14,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/14/us-usa-immigration-alabamaidUSTRE79D4SQ20111014 (reporting that 1054 Hispanic students were absent from Alabama
schools the day H.B. 56 was scheduled to take effect).
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those who support H.B. 56 are concerned about targeting children, as
evidenced by the words of this Alabama resident, “I think a lot of
what we're hearing is panic, and if (immigrants are) here illegally they
should be scared, but I don't see any reason to drag children into
148
something that's not even sorted out yet.”

148

Id. (quoting statement of Garrett Harrison).

